



Reinvigorating Cosmopolitan Citizenship in an Era of Protectionist State

Karunakar Patra

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Dyal Singh College, University of Delhi.

E-mail: karunakpatra@gmail.com

Abstract: Cosmopolitan consciousness and cosmopolitan obligations remain at stake in contemporary times with the resurgence of exclusivist nationalism, nationalist pride, and patriotism. States formulate policies to secure their territorial sovereignty and integrity against both internal and external threats. Internal security policies are intended to protect the state from the entry of unregistered illegal migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers from outside, who arrive each year and place pressure on host countries to recognise and protect their human rights. States erect fences, establish boundaries, and patrol their borders to prohibit the influx of outsiders. They seek to deport illegal migrants and other undocumented inhabitants to their countries of origin. External protection is pursued through the implementation of policies that allow entry only to those who can obtain visas issued by host nations, often as part of regulated immigration or the granting of limited citizenship rights. Furthermore, intense competition in trade and commerce has fostered a protectionist attitude among states, further restricting the movement of labourers, executives, migrants, tourists, students, and others to host nations. The extent of such measures is evident when states impose complete bans on the entry of people from certain countries. In these contexts, we observe that cosmopolitan values, in general, and cosmopolitan citizenship, in particular, are undermined. The ethical, cultural, and political concerns of cosmopolitan ideals demand universal humanism, cultural pluralism, and political institutions that promote global democracy, even in situations of global instability, war, peace, prosperity, ecological sustainability, and the protection of universal human rights. This study emphasises the ontology of cosmopolitanism and underscores the urgency of reinvigorating it in the growing context of state protectionism.

Keywords: Cosmopolitan, Patriotism, Universal Humanism, Cultural Pluralism, Reinvigorating, State Protectionism

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Introduction

The contemporary challenges to cosmopolitan philosophy as both an ideal and a praxis in the context of growing protectionist state policies in the globalised era are certainly a matter of concern for political theorists, sociologists, philosophers, and policymakers alike. Cosmopolitan consciousness and cosmopolitan obligations remain at stake amid the contemporary resurgence of exclusivist nationalism, nationalist pride, and patriotism. States formulate policies to secure their territorial sovereignty and integrity against both internal and external threats. Internal security policies seek to protect the state from the entry of unregistered illegal migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers arriving from outside each year, thereby placing pressure on host countries to recognise and protect their human rights. States erect fences, establish boundaries, and patrol their borders to prohibit the influx of outsiders. They seek to deport illegal migrants and other undocumented inhabitants to their countries of origin. External protection is pursued through the implementation of policies that allow entry only to those who can obtain visas issued by host nations, often as part of the process of granting temporary or limited citizenship rights. Furthermore, intense competition in trade and commerce has fostered a protectionist attitude among states, further restricting the movement of labourers, executives, migrants, tourists, students, and others to host nations. The extent of such measures is evident when states impose complete bans on the entry of people from certain countries.

In these contexts, we observe that cosmopolitan values, in general, and cosmopolitan citizenship, in particular, are being undermined. The ethical, cultural, and political concerns of cosmopolitan ideals demand universal humanism, cultural pluralism, and political institutions that promote global democracy, even in situations of global instability, war, peace, prosperity, ecological sustainability, and the protection of universal human rights. In this paper, I have argued that cosmopolitan consciousness, cosmopolitan education, and the active participation of cosmopolitan citizens, together with the practice of universal humanity, cultural plurality, and global democracy, can mitigate the extreme effects of protectionist state policies driven by global competition for hegemony. The reinvigoration of cosmopolitan citizenship in the context of growing competition among nation-states is presented as a means of addressing what may be a temporary phase of heightened protectionism, which can be stabilised through a strong and deeply rooted sense of cosmopolitan consciousness and practice. This paper emphasises the ontology of cosmopolitanism and underscores the urgency of reinvigorating it in the growing context of state protectionism. It further attempts to

understand the growing challenges to cosmopolitan citizenship in contemporary times, when nation-states are engaged in intense competition for global hegemony and domination. In a globalised world, we need to readjust our approaches to engage with the complexity of global challenges amid growing tensions arising from war, forced displacement, migration, refugee movements, and related crises.

Cosmopolitan Ontology

The ontological dimension of cosmopolitan ideas represents a set of beliefs about human existence, mobility, and travel across different parts of the world without losing one's cultural roots. The basis of thinking about cosmopolitan ideas emanates from human behaviour itself. Wandering human beings did not want to limit their mobility; instead, they sought to discover what lay beyond their locality, border, or territory. The imagination of cosmopolitanism, from the classical period to contemporary times, adheres to the universalism of humanity, the identity and dignity of personhood, and the freedom of self-realisation. Cosmopolitans are less concerned with the fixed borders of political communities, and thus they do not fix their loyalties exclusively to any particular community, "whether of birth or choice, but they owe their allegiance to the more universal community of human beings." However, contemporary understandings of cosmopolitanism encompass much more, ranging from openness to legal, political, and ethical ideals to broader visions of justice and identity.

Nationalism and patriotism might create hurdles for cosmopolitans because they adhere to the political principles of national obligation and allegiance to their own political community. However, it is important not to undermine cosmopolitan consciousness because it embodies different principles of allegiance. The relationship between the national and the cosmopolitan can coexist and can be reciprocal. The current crises of globalisation and other global challenges require greater attention to cosmopolitan thinking about how to make the world more sustainable, not only in terms of economic development but also in addressing issues such as war, violence, forced migration, starvation, global warming, climate change, and related challenges. It becomes difficult to address global challenges of varying magnitudes when bounded nation-states and their citizens develop a narrow sense of patriotism and belonging within closed borders. Nation-states are becoming increasingly disengaged from one another and often display non-cooperative behaviour in dealing with some of the most pressing challenges confronting humanity.

Patriotism is a connection between oneself and others—the larger community—within a situated or bounded territory. Patriotism can be understood in two ways: as a source of both pride and shame. It is the collective sentiment of patriots, who take pride in national achievements, such as winning a game or even a war against another country. Conversely, it may also evoke feelings of shame in situations of defeat, subjugation, or colonial domination. Cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, does not diminish a person's love for one's homeland—the place where one is born, grows up, and lives. Rather, it reflects a broader vision of humanity and a shared sense of belonging.

The principle of the equal moral worth of individuals suggests that every human being is entitled to equal moral consideration, compatible with that accorded to all human agents, and thus implies specific duties arising from this equal moral worth. The cosmopolitan imagination allows an individual to develop a moral commitment and recognises that one has moral duties towards the wider human community (Martha Nussbaum, 1996). For other political theorists, cosmopolitanism is a political imagination that enables a person to act, or ought to act, in a world conceived as a single polity guided by formal principles and norms of justice (Charles Beitz, 1979; Thomas Pogge, 2002). Cosmopolitanism has also been understood as a cultural identity (Kwame Anthony Appiah, 2005; Jeremy Waldron, 2000). Some political theorists propose an epistemic version of cosmopolitanism. This perspective argues that individuals have a limited capacity to realise cosmopolitan obligations because they lack sufficient knowledge about others. For others, the emphasis is placed more strongly on motivation. Cosmopolitanism is thus formulated in terms of obligations and duties in such a way that “it is compatible with the constraints posed by human moral motivation.”

The rootedness of cosmopolitanism is regarded as fundamentally moral, emphasising a conception of coexistence rooted in the duties and obligations arising from thick human relationships. Another dimension of rootedness concerns particular forms of obligation, especially those linked to justice, which derive from different facets of political institutions. Although political institutions do not possess the capacity to integrate all human beings into a single community, they can determine those subsets of humanity to which cosmopolitan obligations apply, guided by a proper appreciation of the boundaries of justice.

Cosmopolitan Identity, or Who Is a Cosmopolitan?

The multiple versions of cosmopolitanism visible in contemporary academic debates are undoubtedly indebted to ancient Stoic philosophy. The historical foundations of

Enlightenment cosmopolitanism are derived from Stoicism and continue to be reflected in contemporary internationalism (Lisa Hill, 2000, p. 66). The foundational principles of Stoicism, as described by Plutarch in *On the Fortunes of Alexander*, are discussed by:

Indeed the Politeia of Zeno ... is directed to this one main point, that our life should not be based on cities or peoples, each with its own view of right and wrong, but we should regard all men (*pantas anthropous*) as our fellow-countrymen and fellow citizens, and that there should be one life and one order, like that of a single flock on a common pasture feeding together under a common law. (Baldry, 1965, p. 159)

The term *Oikoumenē*, meaning a world state as envisioned in Stoic philosophy, represents the reality of an individual born into a particular city-state, fulfilling the necessary obligations to it while simultaneously acknowledging obligations to the greater *cosmopolis* as part of universal humanity. In situations involving conflicting loyalties, the duties of a citizen towards the world state or *cosmopolis* would be given priority and would ultimately prevail (Hill, 2000).

With the demise of the great Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius (AD 121–180), the flourishing tradition of Stoicism gradually declined. Nevertheless, the world continues to remember his famous declaration: “My city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is the world.”

How and why is the state coercive? Is post-national membership a matter of easy acceptance in a globalised world, or do nation-states continue to control membership as an expression of national sovereignty? These questions have remained central to debates within citizenship studies, where the legal recognition of citizenship occupies an important place on both sides of the argument. Global citizen action offers another way of understanding global citizenship, one in which legal residence and formal membership are of comparatively lesser significance. Such actions focus on global challenges, including sustainable development, climate change, poverty, war and peace, forced migration, and related issues. Two broad levels of argument emerge here. One concerns the epistemic debate regarding the validity and relevance of global citizenship, while the other focuses on the everyday practice and realisation of citizenship activities and responsibilities.

Hans Schattle examined the everyday practices of global citizenship, particularly trends in global activism and migration. He identified awareness, participation, and responsibility as the primary concepts of global citizenship, while international mobility, cross-cultural empathy, and personal achievement constitute its secondary dimensions (Schattle, 2008). Derek Heater argued that, in its broadest sense, world citizenship refers

to identifying with the entire human race or humanity as a whole. However, it acquires greater justification when accompanied by moral duties and obligations towards the planet inhabited by both humans and non-humans. Developing this ethical position further, he suggests that a more precise understanding is “the recognition that one is subject to and should live by the codes of supra- and transnational laws (natural and international) and possibly, in due time, to a universal world law” (Heater, 1999, p. 136). In its most developed form, world citizenship represents an ethical ideal that envisages an effective supranational political authority and collective global action extending beyond the authority of the nation-state.

Richard Falk proposes four levels in the extension of citizenship globally and identifies five images of global citizenship. His conception begins, first, with an aspirational spirit that seeks to create conditions of “peace, justice and sustainability for the entire world”, representing a normative vision. Second, he identifies the forces of globalisation, which he argues strengthen this global mode of thinking. Third is the politics of necessity, recognising that more effective global political action and greater control over accelerating environmental disasters are imperative for the survival of the human race (Falk, as cited in Heater, 1999, p. 132). Fourth is the politics of mobilisation, which seeks not merely to think about change but to take action to bring it about.

Falk further identifies five images of the global citizen. First are those advocating institutional reform, often combining utopian aspirations with pragmatic approaches. Second are individuals engaged in transnational affairs, particularly globally mobile corporate elites, who embrace a cosmopolitan identity because of their work and lifestyle. Third is the individual who adopts a lifestyle consistent with maintaining a sustainable global economy and an ethic of environmental responsibility. Fourth, the integrative process of the European Union represents a regional or continental model of transnational citizenship. Fifth are grassroots organisations whose activities pursue global agendas and possess a worldwide reach. Individuals engaged in these activities contribute to the emergence of a global civil society. Falk explains their significance by maintaining that:

Traditional citizenship operates spatially, whereas global citizenship operates temporally, reaching out to a future to be created and making such a person a citizen pilgrim, that is, someone on a journey to a country to be established in the future in accordance with more idealistic and normatively rich conceptions of political community. (Falk, as cited in Heater, 1999, p. 138))

According to Gerard Delanty, cosmopolitanism may be understood in four forms: legal (or international), political (or global), cultural (or transnational), and civic (or

post-national). Legal cosmopolitanism represents a relatively weak Kantian conception centred on a system of legal status constrained by law. Political or global cosmopolitanism seeks to create conditions for an active global civil society and mobilises the forces of globalisation in generating non-state, or even anti-state, forms of politics.

Delanty distinguishes legal cosmopolitanism from political cosmopolitanism by associating the former with government and the latter with governance. Cultural cosmopolitanism refers to the increasing mobility of people across the world, whether voluntary or forced, resulting in the expansion of diasporic experiences in which millions retain their original cultures while living outside their traditional homelands. Some scholars describe this condition as rooted cosmopolitanism. Civic cosmopolitanism, meanwhile, relates to a non-national sense of community.

Taken together, these interpretations and classifications may be broadly organised into a threefold framework consisting of range, intensity, and status (Heater, p. 14). Range refers to the basic dimensions of moral, cultural, and institutional justice, as discussed by Pogge, Beitz, and Scheffler. Intensity denotes the depth of commitment exhibited by world citizens in fulfilling cosmopolitan responsibilities, as emphasised by Delanty, Falk, and Heater. Status, as proposed by Delanty, concerns the institutional and political position occupied by cosmopolitan citizenship.

Cosmopolitanism and justice are closely related, in the sense that cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan citizenship may be understood as demands of justice. Cosmopolitan or global justice, together with its broadly egalitarian distributive principles applicable to all individuals, helps reinvigorate responses to the immediate and complex challenges confronting cosmopolitan citizenship. For Janna Thompson, the “meaning of world citizenship” is partly determined by the pattern of cosmopolitan distributive justice and by “the entitlement of each individual to an adequate share of the world’s resources” (Thompson, 1998, p. 180).

Challenges of Cosmopolitan Citizenship

The notion of cosmopolitan citizenship is not free from criticism. Much of the criticism levelled against it is rooted in the perspective of national and bounded citizenship. Critics compare national and cosmopolitan citizenship primarily from the standpoint of the nation-state. They point to the perceived limitations of cosmopolitan citizenship from a statist perspective, arguing that the rights and security of cosmopolitan citizens cannot be guaranteed without the existence of a world state. Brett Bowden argues that “the notion of global citizenship is fraught with many of the same concerns and dangers

associated with the condition of statelessness; an absence of the guarantee of rights and security that are generally taken for granted by citizens of stable sovereign states” (Bowden, 2003).

However, defenders such as Muetzelfeldt and Smith (2002, pp. 55–75) argue that the activities of global civil society and institutions of global governance create conditions conducive to global citizenship. Another criticism derives from the nature of the relationship between the individual and the *polis*. The “notion of a *polis* extended around the globe ... implies some form of world state, or federation of states”, which could support a broad framework of supranational law (Featherstone, 2002, p. 3). The core of Hannah Arendt’s argument is that “Nobody can be a citizen of the world as he is the citizen of his country”, and that “A citizen is by definition a citizen among citizens of a country among countries” (Arendt, 1973, p. 84). However, not all proponents of cosmopolitanism accept this position, nor are they convinced by Arendt’s warning that “the establishment of one sovereign world state, far from being the prerequisite for world citizenship, would be the end of all citizenship. It would not be the climax of world politics, but quite literally its end” (Arendt, 1973, p. 84).

Derek Heater argues that “the state ... is a reality, performs vital functions and therefore its preservation is in the interests of humankind. Conversely, world government has neither reality nor expedience” (Heater, 1990, p. 229). Along similar lines, the jurist L. C. Green maintains that “any propaganda in favour of a world state remains just that”. Furthermore, he argues that “the suggestion that a world citizenship could exist side by side with existing nationalities [as the Stoics sought] remains artificial and any ‘citizenship’ so granted would be hollow in character, constantly giving way to the demands of existing sovereign states” (Green, 1987, p. 184). Derek Heater, borrowing Jeremy Bentham’s aphorism, remarked that “world citizenship is nonsense; active world citizenship is nonsense on stilts” (Heater, 1990, p. 229). The Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism has often been viewed in this way, despite the “benevolence and venerability” that many modern cosmopolitans continue to attribute to it. Ulrich Beck similarly advocates the construction of “cosmopolitan world politics” within a “transnational framework”, pursued through what he describes as the “reinvention of politics” and the emergence of a new political subject—namely, cosmopolitan parties (Beck, 2002, p. 41).

Reinvigoration of Cosmopolitan Citizenship

Cosmopolitanism is temporarily lagging behind the resurgence of national sovereignty and hegemonic politics during the present phase of intense global competition among

nation-states. The multiple challenges confronting the contemporary world provide an impetus to reignite cosmopolitan solidarity and cooperation among states and peoples. This moral anchorage of cosmopolitanism, in an age of growing uncertainty, carries significant philosophical implications and is historically grounded in traditions of multiculturalism (Pagden, 2000). Contemporary versions of the cosmopolitan ideal are no longer confined to Western traditions and practices; they increasingly extend beyond the Western world.

In this context, do we need to reinvigorate cosmopolitan citizenship? Why should we consider revitalising this idea? The answer lies in the foundational principles of cosmopolitanism and in the historical trajectory through which it has evolved despite numerous complexities. To address the multiple challenges confronting cosmopolitanism, there is a need to strive for a stable international order in which peace and prosperity, dignity and rights, and freedom and equality for all human beings are compatible with cosmopolitan visions of citizenship. The reinvigoration of cosmopolitan citizenship may be pursued through multiple dimensions—moral, cultural, and political. These multiple principles and standards make cosmopolitanism inclusive and pluralistic without reducing it to essentialism. At the same time, each cosmopolitan principle retains its distinctiveness while interacting with the others, thereby contributing to a comprehensive framework for revitalising cosmopolitan citizenship as both an ideal and a practice. Unlike national citizenship, which is territorially bounded and limited, cosmopolitan citizenship transcends territorial boundaries without losing its roots and aspires towards a broader cosmopolitan vision. As Beck (2002) argues, the cosmopolitan imagination represents an alternative way of life:

The national perspective is a monologic imagination, which excludes the otherness of the other. The cosmopolitan perspective is an alternative imagination, an imagination of alternative ways of life and rationalities, which include the otherness of the other. It puts the negotiation of contradictory cultural experiences into the centre of activities: in the political, the economic, the scientific and the social. (Beck, 2002)

Moral Cosmopolitan Standards

Moral cosmopolitanism suggests “that every human being has a global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern” (Pogge, 1992, p. 49). Beitz asserts that “cosmopolitanism about ethics does not necessarily imply cosmopolitanism about institutions” (Beitz, 1999, p. 287). In practical terms, moral cosmopolitanism seeks to establish moral standards to assess the appropriateness “of particular kinds of institutions for ensuring

that the cosmopolitan ethical principle of the equal worth of all human beings as world citizens is honoured in both political theory and practice” (as cited in Heater, 2000, p. 9).

Thomas Pogge distinguishes between the moral and legal dimensions of cosmopolitanism. Legal cosmopolitanism entails “a commitment to a concrete political ideal of a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, are fellow citizens of a universal republic” (Pogge, 1992, p. 49). In contrast, “moral cosmopolitanism enforces limits upon our behavior and, in particular, upon our efforts to construct institutional schemes.” Pogge’s further distinction between institutional and interactional moral cosmopolitanism clarifies his position. Institutional moral cosmopolitanism concerns the formulation of rules of justice to be observed by social institutions and practices, with individuals assuming responsibility through their membership of or participation in such institutions. Interactional moral cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, concerns the conduct of individuals, particularly when they act independently or collectively.

A fundamental question raised by scholars of international law and international society concerns the political community: what is the “right relationship between duties to fellow citizens and duties to the human race” (Linklater, 1990)? Early modern thinkers such as Pufendorf (1934) and Vattel (1916), writing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, also addressed this question by imagining “an original state of nature” in which “all individuals were subject to the natural law and all had moral rights and duties in common.”

In this natural condition, no legal or political institutions existed to regulate individual conduct or establish legitimate expectations among individuals. Consequently, the contours of moral rights and obligations were open to multiple interpretations. These conflicts gradually diminished as people formed different kinds of civil societies to define and enforce legal rights and duties for legally recognised citizens of independent sovereign states. Modern social contract theory established the principle that an individual’s primary duty is owed to fellow nationals, after which obligations might be extended to “other peoples”. Modern thinkers such as Pufendorf and Vattel did not fully envisage that “the duties to humanity were the duties of world citizens.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that “those who claim to love humanity invariably end up loving no one at all.” His preference was for small, autarkic republics in which close civic ties would not be permanently threatened by cosmopolitan moralities and transcendent religions (Hofmann, 1965; Miller, 1999, p. 67). The first major modern political thinker

to advocate the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship as a challenge to the privileges of the sovereign state was Immanuel Kant. Kant developed his cosmopolitan ideal by drawing upon the Stoic belief in the equality of all human beings, an idea forcefully expressed by Cicero, who argued that “since we are all subject to a single law of nature ... we are bound not to harm anyone” (as cited in Nussbaum, 1997, p. 31).

Pufendorf, like other social contract theorists, defended the principle that individuals should refrain from harming others. Kant, however, argued that this principle was not taken seriously in international relations. Although Kant remained a strong defender of the harm principle, his conception of world citizenship remained relatively limited in scope. “All the moral law governing citizens of a universal state of humanity required was the duty of hospitality to travellers visiting their lands” (Kant, 1970, p. 206). Kant did not conceive universal humanity in terms of a world government because he believed that such an arrangement would fail to accommodate cultural differences and the practical requirements of everyday life, ultimately leading to despotism. Instead, he strongly defended the sovereign equality of nation-states and the principle of non-intervention. Nevertheless, within this framework, he recognised space for the reinvigoration of world citizenship, reaffirming the possibility of universal humanity alongside a robust system of sovereign states. His conception of world citizenship also “entail[ed] a sort of restraint that the dominant European powers should respect the non-European peoples as part of [the] fundamental moral duty not to harm others” (Williams & Booth, 1996, p. 91). Sovereign states, Kant maintained, should conduct their foreign relations according to the “principle of publicity”. The essence of the Kantian claim is that “all individuals and peoples who are in a position to affect or harm one another are required to create a civil constitution and obliged to progress together towards a cosmopolitan condition of general political security” (Kant, 1970).

Human beings have thus claimed and enjoyed different sets of rights alongside the consolidation of the modern state. Citizenship, as a legal status, recognises legal, political, social, and multicultural rights while simultaneously requiring citizens to perform duties of allegiance and obligation towards the state. Modern citizenship evolved alongside the development of the modern state, particularly during its early phase of consolidation, establishing an active contract with different social groups and classes that contributed to strengthening state authority. Bhikhu Parekh (2003, p. 29) argues that citizens have two fundamental kinds of duties: general duties and special duties. Both derive from different dimensions of moral life. General duties arise from everyday civic life and are prescribed both by the law of the land and by individual moral

responsibilities. They also include the obligations owed to those with whom citizens share uniquely close relationships. Special duties, by contrast, are more exclusive and involve a deeper commitment to promoting “the well-being of the entire humankind”, exemplified by figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and Albert Schweitzer. Parekh illustrates Gandhi’s cosmopolitanism as follows:

Determined to be a *vishvamanav*, a man who belonged to the universe, Gandhi disclaimed special ties to his wife, children, and close relations, so much so that when a friend offered his son a scholarship to go to England, Gandhi advised him to give it to someone more qualified or in greater need. Even he, however, had close friends, co-workers, and fellow countrymen to whom he knew he owed special duties, which he conscientiously discharged. (Parekh, 2003)

The reinvigoration of cosmopolitan citizenship in today’s turbulent times requires, first and foremost, that citizens critically examine the policies of their own countries and evaluate whether those policies adversely affect others. Such constant vigilance helps ensure that national interests do not undermine the interests of others and instead promote the broader cause of humanity. Today, we observe that some states, in the name of global trade, supply dangerous weapons or enter into agreements based on manipulative designs that ultimately corrupt the political leadership of other countries. Such practices represent narrow and intimidating policies. In a robust and vibrant democracy, citizens can become aware of these policies and developments and seek to challenge them through organised public pressure and protest. The reinvigoration of global citizenship is therefore possible through the democratic deepening of national citizenship. Global citizenship should not be viewed as a rival to national citizenship but rather as its complementary extension.

The effectiveness of global citizenship can also be strengthened by discharging our universal duties to humankind through the mediating agency of the nation-state. Responsible citizens who possess a strong sense of national identity and belonging also experience moral discomfort when their country behaves unjustly and are willing to protest against such actions. By contrast, apathetic citizens are guided neither by national responsibility nor by global awareness. At another level, global citizenship can be strengthened through an active interest in the affairs of other countries. This should not be understood as an attempt to control the lives or well-being of others but rather as the pursuit of a moral responsibility towards universal human well-being. Ethical concern should also be expressed by mobilising international public opinion whenever governments engage in ethnic cleansing, genocide, or the systematic oppression and

denial of their citizens' fundamental rights. Furthermore, cosmopolitan citizenship can be reinvigorated through sustained efforts to establish a just world order. Nations must cooperate on fair terms and pursue common interests so that they may live peacefully while respecting one another's legitimate needs and concerns. A shared commitment to safeguarding life, liberty, and well-being across all parts of the world through cosmopolitan principles creates the conditions for lasting peace and harmony.

Cultural Cosmopolitan Standards

Samuel Scheffler makes a twofold distinction between cosmopolitanism about justice and cosmopolitanism about culture. Cosmopolitanism about justice stands opposed to anything that “posits principled restrictions on the scope of an adequate conception of justice.” It also rejects any argument that accepts “in principle that the norms of justice apply primarily within bounded groups comprising some subset of the global population.” On the other hand, cultural cosmopolitanism is opposed “to any suggestion that individuals’ well-being, identity, or capacity for effective human agency normally depends upon their membership in a determinate cultural group whose boundaries are reasonably clear and whose stability and cohesion are reasonably secure” (Scheffler, 1999, p. 256).

From these two conceptions, Scheffler derives two forms of world citizenship:

World citizenship as justice means that the norms of justice must ultimately be seen as governing the relations of all human beings to each other, and not merely as applying within individual societies or bounded groups of other kinds; while world citizenship as culture means that individuals have the capacity to flourish by forging idiosyncratic identities from heterogeneous cultural sources and are not to be thought of as constituted or defined by ascriptive ties to a particular culture, community, or tradition. (Scheffler, 1999, p. 258)

Scheffler examines the ambiguous nature of citizenship. He identifies two broad groups of thinkers who approach the idea of world citizenship from either more extreme or more moderate perspectives. The more radical proponents argue that one is justified in giving distinctive consideration to certain groups, such as family members or compatriots, only insofar as they are regarded as part of the larger community of equal human beings. Since it is impossible to act as an effective world citizen towards all humanity simultaneously, individuals must, for practical rather than principled reasons, exercise their global civic responsibilities within those circles that are accessible to them.

As Hayden (2005, p. 22) observes, “In an important respect then, Kant’s cosmopolitan vision of a universal community of humankind builds upon the Greek ethical sensibility, and guides it into the domain of actual political process and juridical organization” (see also Hall, 2002). The Kantian ideal of cosmopolitanism, as Stuart Hall (2002) argues, reflects a liberal universalism founded upon the twin principles of moral universalism and state neutrality towards any particular culture, except insofar as the protection of individual rights is concerned. However, Hall remains sceptical that liberal universalism provides the most appropriate framework for cosmopolitan modernity. The principal weakness of this framework lies in its practical limitations, as it often fails to guarantee equality and freedom for all citizens regardless of their cultural backgrounds. Rizvi (2008), discussing Hall’s position, notes that Hall’s critique of liberal cosmopolitanism “assumes a fixed notion of tradition as already constituted in authority, as well as a view of culture as static, and not as something that is continuously changing, responding to the new circumstances in which it is embedded and encountered” (Hall, 2002, p. 30). Hall instead argues for “globally open spaces”, where individuals cultivate a form of “vernacular cosmopolitanism” that “is aware of the limitations of any one culture or any one identity and that is radically aware of its insufficiency in governing a wider society, but which nevertheless is prepared to rescind its claims to the traces of difference, which make its life important.”

The moderate understanding of world citizenship, by contrast, requires individuals to develop multiple yet distinctively justified allegiances, among which a genuine commitment to humanity beyond one’s immediate circles occupies an important place. Cultural cosmopolitanism remains a contested concept because it has been interpreted in multiple ways to justify the universal character of humanity. Consequently, cultural cosmopolitanism has evolved into both strong and moderate versions.

The stronger version celebrates the fusion of cultures and emphasises the protection of people’s rights to pursue their chosen cultural practices and identities freely. Over time, however, this version may contribute to the homogenisation of cultural practices and the emergence of a hybrid global culture. The moderate version, by contrast, does not advocate the dissolution of political communities but instead supports “the survival of cultural communities”, recognising them as valuable repositories of human diversity that may be threatened by excessive cultural homogenisation.

An important advocate of the moderate position, Kwame Anthony Appiah, links cosmopolitanism with patriotism through what he calls “rooted cosmopolitanism”.

He argues that the stronger version of ethical cosmopolitanism, which seeks to minimise national borders—a position associated with the Stoics and more recently with Martha Nussbaum—is problematic because “cosmopolitan values seen as such are essentially only covertly imperialist.” He questions the motives underlying ethical cosmopolitanism, describing it as “parochialism, yet again, puffed up with universalist pretensions; liberalism on safari” (Appiah, 2007, p. 214).

Appiah is therefore sceptical of contemporary liberal understandings of cosmopolitanism centred solely on the autonomous individual. Instead, he advances a more communitarian perspective that emphasises the accommodation of identity formation at multiple levels, ranging from the local to the global. This understanding of cosmopolitanism recognises the cultural embeddedness of identity and celebrates rootedness alongside the diversity of human ways of life. Whereas ethical cosmopolitanism advocates the universal equality of all human beings, the moderate cultural version emphasises “the existence of a multiplicity of political states as the reservoir of cultural heterogeneity of mankind.”

Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (1998), in *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, examine cultural cosmopolitanism through a reconsideration of postcolonial theory, particularly in the writings of thinkers such as James Clifford (1988) and Homi K. Bhabha (1990). In contrast to earlier postcolonial perspectives, which frequently celebrated cultural hybridity, these scholars argue that identity may be understood through more complex cosmopolitan cultural formations. Thinkers who depart from earlier versions of postcolonial theory seek to problematise the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism and, in doing so, open up possibilities for alternative and graded forms of cosmopolitanism.

One of the central tensions within cultural cosmopolitanism concerns the relationship between national particularism and cosmopolitan universalism. In his essay “Cosmopolitan Patriotism”, Appiah draws attention to “the paradox in which the cosmopolitans who advocate cultural plurality could find themselves” (Cheah & Robbins, 1998). Once a supposedly universal culture becomes dominant, other cultures risk being relegated to subordinate or minority positions. Universal culture is therefore criticised for its homogenising and universalising tendencies. The resulting dilemma is that advocates of cultural plurality cannot consistently endorse a model in which everyone becomes simply a citizen of the world if such citizenship erases cultural diversity. Many critics reject this universalist project because they regard it as fundamentally Western in origin.

It has been noted that “the romantic conception of culture as a whole connected to the ethnic community was not applied for a long time, if it ever did. Therefore, there is no such thing as a pure culture, as all are involved with one another; they are all hybrid, heterogeneous, extremely diverse, and non-monolithic” (Said, 1994). It also highlights that “the identity policy questions raised earlier were the basis for the formation of the theory, as well as the practice, of contemporary multiculturalism, which seeks not only to protect cultures from global assimilation but also to diminish the threat of fundamentalist cultural aberrations.”

Cultural cosmopolitanism has also been reinvigorated through a robust engagement with the internationalisation of education, which provides a distinctive model of educational transformation. Educational curricula across the world are increasingly being designed in ways that respond to the changing dynamics and requirements of globalisation, including its cultural, economic, political, interpersonal, and international dimensions (e.g., Beazley, 1993). Such curricula enable students to develop intercultural understanding and cultivate an international outlook that equips them to engage with the complexities of an increasingly global environment.

Educational systems can help citizens develop values such as innovation, flexibility, client-centredness, entrepreneurial culture, intercultural understanding, and cooperation. Beyond preparing students for global trade, business, and labour markets, they also promote multicultural and cosmopolitan societies. Nel Noddings (2005) argues that global citizenship should focus on a cluster of cultural attitudes related to social justice, cultural and social diversity, and care for the Earth as the foundation of human habitation. According to her, global citizenship education should be grounded in ethical concerns and values such as “community-building and mutual respect, social responsibility, appreciation for diversity and social justice.” She also advocates the teaching of emotional literacy and constructive approaches to managing and resolving conflict.

Fazal Rizvi, however, takes a different position from Noddings’ value-based approach. While acknowledging the importance of global interconnectedness in shaping socio-cultural conditions, he argues that global citizenship should not be tied to national vainglory or ideological biases but “has to become cosmopolitan with a focus on attempts to develop in students a set of epistemic virtues with which to understand the dynamics of global transformations.” Rizvi further emphasises that increasing intercultural connectivity and multicultural initiatives should not undermine the importance of local issues. The process of global connectivity, he argues,

is reinvigorated “neither through systems nor structures organised around some central focus of power”, but through the “play of popular consciousness.” Rather, it develops “organically through the shifting subjectivities of people.”

John Tomlinson refers to this phenomenon as “complex connectivity”, which encompasses “the rapidly developing and ever-densening networks of interconnections and interdependences that characterise modern social life” (Tomlinson, 2000, p. 2). He further argues that this connectivity implies proximity as a socio-cultural condition and suggests a form of cultural awareness that has, in many respects, become global. Similarly, Roland Robertson maintains that globalisation inherently involves “the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson, 1992, p. 8). This perspective highlights the need to understand even the most localised contexts in supraterritorial terms.

Political Cosmopolitan Standard

Why are global institutions so often resisted? One reason is that they are perceived to undermine, at least to some extent, the sovereignty of nation-states. Such resistance, however, is difficult to justify if individuals are understood to have duties that extend beyond their own political communities. Actions undertaken by external actors are frequently challenged in the name of non-interference because they are seen as violating, directly or indirectly, the principle of national sovereignty. Nation-states exercise sovereign authority in pursuit of their national interests. Yet, in an increasingly interconnected world, this has become far more complex. No nation-state is entirely free to pursue its interests without affecting others. Likewise, no country, however powerful, can completely insulate itself from external challenges such as terrorism, climate change, global trade, and economic instability. The challenge, therefore, is how to strengthen political cosmopolitan standards while maintaining an appropriate balance between the local and the global.

Charles Beitz distinguishes between moral cosmopolitanism and institutional cosmopolitanism. Institutional cosmopolitanism seeks to restructure the world’s political system so that territorial states and other political units operate within, and are ultimately accountable to, supranational institutional arrangements (Beitz, 1999, p. 287). From this perspective, Beitz questions the adequacy of the existing United Nations system and advocates its reform, supplementation, or, where necessary, replacement. Within such an institutional framework, the protection of individual human rights becomes an effective means of recognising individuals as world citizens.

The political dimension of cosmopolitan democracy has been most fully developed by David Held. He emphasises the importance of procedural norms and institutional structures that ensure accountability for forms of power operating beyond the reach of conventional democratic control. Held also stresses the significance of education and public awareness in cultivating cosmopolitan citizens capable of reconciling “national traditions, communities of fate and alternative forms of life.” Furthermore, he argues that if the cosmopolitan project is to operate effectively across multiple levels of governance, those exercising power must remain accountable, and the challenges that affect humanity from the local to the global level must be subject to democratic regulation (Held et al., 1994).

Beyond this broad justification lies a more comprehensive defence of cosmopolitan democracy. The starting point is what David Held calls “the principle of autonomy”. Held explains:

Persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations in determining the political framework that generates and limits the opportunities available to them; that is, they should be free and equal in determining the conditions of their own lives, so long as they do not use this framework to negate the rights of others. (Held, 1995)

Herein lies the essence of citizenship—a status enjoyed intrinsically by all members of a democratic polity. But in today’s world, are citizens truly able to enjoy autonomy? The problem is that both national citizens and states are affected in multifarious ways by decisions made and actions taken by other states and organisations across the globe. As a consequence, citizens’ autonomous control over their lives through the state is significantly eroded. Held and other advocates of cosmopolitan democracy argue that restoring and extending citizens’ autonomy requires a rethinking of democratic theory and a restructuring of the world’s institutional order along democratic lines. Democracy should permeate the world’s economic and political systems so that individuals can act as world citizens and hold accountable those transnational institutions and agencies that affect their lives. Indeed, the role of world citizens is twofold: to work towards the achievement of cosmopolitan democracy and to participate in the reformed system as it comes into being. The parallel with the evolution of democratic citizenship at the state level is evident, as Daniele Archibugi observes:

What is needed now is the participation of new political subjects. According to the cosmopolitan project, they should be world citizens, provided with the institutional channels to participate and assume duties vis-à-vis the global destiny. If citizens had not been capable of assuming responsibility directly, democracy would never have

enjoyed such great success in many countries. It is no vain hope, therefore, to believe that the time will come when the citizens of the world will take upon themselves the responsibility of managing this small planet of theirs democratically. (Archibugi, 1998)

What, in political terms, would a cosmopolitan democratic order look like? Its key characteristic is multiplicity: multiple institutions of different kinds operating at multiple levels, with individuals participating through multiple forms of citizenship. The world would be organised into a network of local, national, regional, and global institutions that provide opportunities for democratic participation, including referendums, and operate according to the principle of subsidiarity. Thus, at the global level, a reformed and democratically accountable United Nations would address issues of genuinely global concern. World citizenship would expand through the proliferation of different levels and forms of citizenship. David Held expresses this anticipated outcome as follows:

These mechanisms would help contribute ... to the preservation of the ideal of a rightful share in the process of governance, even in contexts where dispute settlement and problem resolution would inevitably be at some considerable distance from local groups and assemblies. (Held, 1995)

As a result, “citizenship would be extended, in principle, to membership in all cross-cutting political communities, from the local to the global.”

Jürgen Habermas envisages a form of global citizenship exercised through a global public sphere, an idea originally proposed by Kant, in which global political communication becomes a reality at the cosmopolitan level. The claim that global citizenship is merely a phantom is thereby challenged, as it can instead be understood as existing in continuity with state citizenship. Today, we observe that numerous initiatives undertaken at the United Nations to address global challenges have emerged not only because of the growing global consciousness of states but also because of the efforts of global civil society. The historical development of this consciousness at multiple levels has strengthened and revitalised supranational forms of global governance. Habermas also argues, with reference to Kant’s essay *Perpetual Peace*, that reforms within the United Nations could contribute to the reinvigoration of global democracy. Deliberative democracy makes decision-making more substantive, particularly in situations characterised by inherited cultural diversity, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of democratic outcomes. Such deliberative processes become especially valuable when people from different cultural backgrounds come together at the global level to formulate policies and address common global challenges.

Influenced by Kant and Habermas, James Bohman emphasises the role of global social movements in the cosmopolitan public sphere. He argues that national governments must justify their actions through public reasoning when responding to issues of global concern. Such justificatory action, grounded in critical deliberation, becomes cosmopolitan, Bohman argues, “when networks of communication and the audience transcend national boundaries. A developing cosmopolitan public sphere renews democracy within the state and through the associations of international civil society.” He further suggests that, although official transnational institutions—such as the European Parliament—have an important role to play, even more crucial is the development of transnational institutions that facilitate public debate and democratic decision-making by world citizens.

Conclusion

Cosmopolitan citizenship does not focus solely on the legal framework of rights available to national citizens within the bounded territory of the nation-state. Rather, it also emphasises the assertion of rights as moral claims, analogous to the distinction between moral rights and legal rights. This implies that moral claims advanced by individuals may, over time, become recognised as legal rights by sovereign states. A similar process may occur within transnational contexts, where different forms of legal and political rights emerge. The moral claims of cosmopolitans include demands for hospitality and for the protection of basic human rights by host states.

The various forms of cosmopolitanism enable us to examine legal-political, moral, sociological, and cultural dimensions of contemporary society and to understand how they operate in different contexts. Within this framework, transnationalism may be understood as a form of cross-border solidarity that reinforces cosmopolitan citizenship. Some scholars further argue that transnationalism strengthens the bonds necessary to reinvigorate cosmopolitan citizenship by allowing allegiances to both the home country and the host country to coexist without contradiction. The broader argument is that cosmopolitanism is fundamentally concerned with patterns of social and political life that transcend, while remaining connected to, nation-space or nation-state space.

It is today possible to reform these international organizations to accommodate a direct political role for citizens. While traditional peace theories somehow delegated to governments the task of reaching agreements for international cooperation, cosmopolitan democracy focuses on the role of citizens, who should be empowered to

exercise their rights and duties not only within their own nations but also within the political communities that affect their lives. (Archibugi, 2012)

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